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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
EMtate Tax-Effect of Subsequent Events on Claims
Against the Estate
At decedent's demise in July, 1952, his estate was obligated -to
continue 40 dollar weekly payments to 'his former wife until her death
or remarriage as provided for under divorce decree. The wife received
payments from -the estate totaling $2,079.96 until her remarriage in
June, 1953. The estate return was filed in July, 1953; the administra-
tor claiming a deduction of $27,058.30 which would 'have been due
the -wife based on her life expectancy at the date of the husband's
death. The Tax Court allowed the deduction. Held, reversed. INT.
REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(b) (3), provides for deductions of "claims
against the estate" as -are allowed by the laws of the particular jurisdic-
tion. If events occurring subsequent -to decedent's death better enable
the purpose of the statute to be satisfied, such events will be taken into
account in determining the claim and its allowance under local law.
Commissioner v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
There was a strong dissent in the principal case based primarily
on Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). This
estate tax case concerned the valuation of charitable contributions
subject to a life estate of decedent's wife. Though the wife died six
months after 'her husband's death and before the estate tax return was
filed, the value of her interest was held to be that of the time of testa-
tor's death rather than based on events as they later proved to be. The
crucial date in determining the value of the claim to be deducted was
held to be that of testator's death, the value being no less real at that
time whether or not the facts later proved to be different from their
estimation.
The applicable section of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2053 (a)
(3), provides 'that ". . . the value of the taxable estate shall be deter-
mined 'by deducting from the gross estate such amounts . . . for
claims against the estate . . . as are. allowed by the jurisdiction, . . .
under which the estate is being administered." This section is basically
comparable to § 812(b) (3) of the 1939 code and to previous statutes
including that which controlled in the Ithaca holding.
Many cases have professed the xationale of the Ithaca case as
controlling; however, several holdings have purported to place limita-
tions upon the decision. See Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 29, at 17. The Revenue Ruling states that deductions for ciaims
against ,the estate Will not be allowed where the claims have not been
paid or will not be paid because the creditor waives payment, fails to
file 'according to the applicable local law, or in any other way fails to
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enforce payment. An exception on the foregoing is recognized when
the claim, though not formally presented and paid, is deemed to have
been met by other payments to the claimant in an amount at least
equal to that of the claim.
Such a ruling by the commissioner does not, like a regulation,
have the effect of law. Helvering v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455,
468 (1934). However, the ruling does summarize the divergence from
the Ithaca holding by subsequent cases.
The limitation was darly seen in Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d
233 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929). Here a
claim based on an antenuptial contract, which was enforceable against
the estate of claimant's husband at the time of his death, was denied
because the widow accepted provisions in the husband's will in lieu of
such claims. The court 'based its decision on the reasoning that "...
tax laws deal with actualities; . . . the claims . .. which Congress
intended to be deducted were actual claims, not theoretical ones." The
court further provided that claims to be deductible are those deter-
mined as valid and ".... actually paid or to be paid."
In Du Val's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.
1945), a bank owned a claim against decedent as guarantor of notes,
the claim enforceable under the laws of the local jurisdiction. The
bank consented to the distribution of the estate without payment of its
claim. As the estate was in such a position that it would never have to
pay fthe claim, the amount was not deductible. The court reasoned that
a claim is a mere assertion of a right -which if abandoned is no claim.
The court -in Estate of Annie Feder, 22 T.C. 30 (1954), stated
that it is not necessary for a claim to 'be formally presented and paid
in order to qualify as deductible. However, the fact situation placed
the case within the exception to the limitations of Rev. Rul. 60-247
supra, since 'the claimants received an amount as beneficiaries dn ex-
cess of the deduction allowed. Thus, the claim may be deemed to have
been paid. Under similar facts in Commissioner v. Straus, 77 F.2d 401
(7th Cir. 1935), the same decision was reached.
Also in Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934), the
wife was allowed to deduct a claim against her husband's estate even
though she did not file a claim against the estate. The failure -to file
was immaterial because she was a beneficiary 'taking an amount ex-
ceeding her claim just as in the Feder case. On a further matter the
court denied deductibility of a claim 'based on the deceased stockhold-
er's being liable for the debts of the corporation. Though the obliga-
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tion -was considered legally enforcable under the particular state law,
the court considered the claim potential rather than actual until such
time as it be paid or reasonably certain that -it must be paid.
In Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st
Cir. 1942), there was an enforceable claim at the date of death for
monthly alimony payments of $1,000 during the lifetime of the for-
mer -wife. The divorce decree was compromised -by a decree of the
probate court subsequent -to the testator's death calling for a lump sum
payment plus monthly amounts of $650. The actuarial value of the
latter decree was the one allowed to be deducted by the estate.
Further, the Ithaca case was allegedly limited 'by Helvering v.
Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), and Helvering v.
Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153 (1935), where the subsequent events were
controlled by the beneficiaries.
However, when it is reasonably certain that the claim is to be
paid, the Ithaca case is controlling. Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1955); Maresi v. United States, 152 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.
1946).
The case of Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950), does not seem to 'be within the purview of the Revenue
Ruling. Here the estate was indebted to the executrix. She, through
inadvertence, did not file a claim. The deduction was allowed since
there was an enforceable claim at the date of decedent's death. The
government's contention in the case was the statute should be con-
strued to mean that the claim must be ultimately allowed by the
probate court. The case does not fall within the exception to the
limitations as did the Feder case, supra. In the Winer case the execu-
trix does not take anything under the 'will. However, the Florida
statute on which the deductibility in the Winer case was dependent
is 'unique, no other state having such a law. The statute rules such
obligations void if not filed properly within eight months even
though the personal representative previously recognized the claim.
In the principal case the court disagreed with the reasoning of
the Ithaca and Winer cases in holding that subsequent events are to
be ignored even when they result in the claim's never being paid.
The Tationale of ,the two cases was considered incompatible with the
purpose of 'the code section defining "Net Estate" as " . . .to tax
the passing of property 'by way of gift taking effect at death." Kahn
v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
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The Ithaca case, a United States Supreme Court decision, has not
been expressly overruled even partially by the Supreme Court so as
to conform to the limitations set forth in the Revenue Ruling or
the cited cases. Further, the decisions which have employed the
limitations 'have ,been in inferior courts. The final decision regard-
ing the -intendment of the statute rests with the Supreme Court. It
should 'be construed in such a way as to make for certainty and
uniformity in its application.
Robert Glenn Lilly, Jr.
Evidence-Past Recollection Recorded-Present
Recollection Revived
Upon prosecution for murder in the first degree D objects to
the use by two witnesses of documents -upon which his alleged con-
fession to the crime was recorded. Both witnesses read their notes
verbatim after testifying that they could achieve greater accuracy
from the notes than from their recollection alone or their recollec-
tion refreshed by the notes. Held, it is not error to allow a witness
to read a faithful memorandum where he is devoid of a present
recollection 'but possesses an accurate account of the events made by
him at the time of their occurrence. Hall v. State, 162 A.2d 751
(Md. 1960).
The instant case states clearly and concisely the best and most
widely accepted view concerning a field of evidence which has in
the past been the subject of much misunderstanding. 3 WIGMoRE,
EVMENCE § 735 (3d ed. 1940). It is impossible to discuss past
recollection recorded -without also considering the concept known
as present recollection revived. It is this interrelation which has
caused the courts some 'trouble in distinguishing between the two.
Hall v. State, supra, clearly involves a case of past recollection re-
corded. Here both witnesses testified that they could not remember
clearly the contents of the confession, but both testified that they
could remember having made accurate recordings of the defendant's
statements at he time of their occurrence. The value of such testi-
mony is readily discernible, the frailty of the human memory gives
impetus to the acceptance of this rule 'by the courts, and the ends
of justice are best served by its use.
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